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Abstract
This paper analyzes the application for research and development (R&D) subsidies in
Finland. Finnish firm-level data on applicants and potential applicants is used to
characterize firms application behavior. In addition to analyzing the characteristics
underlying application for R&D subsidies, this paper also examines the use of count data
models in modeling the application for R&D subsidies. The findings of this paper suggest
that firms that are the most likely to have eligible projects, are also aware of the R&D
subsidy program. The results also suggest that the opportunity cost of applying is lower for
firms quite at the beginning of their life cycle, and provide evidence that external
knowledge is important in lowering the application cost. Industry level heterogeneity in
application behavior seems to be related to the application activity of potential applicants
rather than the awareness of the program. The model selection exercise indicates that in
using a count data framework to model the application behavior it is important to take into
account both unobserved heterogeneity and excess zeros.
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1 Introduction
Direct research and development (R&D) subsidies to business sector are a widely
used policy tool to encourage industrial R&D. They are the second largest and
fastest growing form of industrial aid in developed countries (Nezu, 1998). In
Finland where the data of this paper originates, R&D subsidies are the most
important tool of innovation policy (Georghiu et al., 2003). Given the impor-
tance of R&D subsidies we know surprisingly little about the processes that
allocate them. There is a widespread political urge to get plausible evidence
about the effectiveness of this policy tool in terms of additionality, productivity
and growth, but it seems that this pronounced focus on impact estimates has
diverted attention from the issue of allocation. To get reliable evidence of the ef-
fectiveness and functioning of a policy tool like R&D subsidies, the participation
process determining who is finally granted a subsidy has to be well understood
(Heckman and Smith, 2004). The participation process consists of two deci-
sions: application decision and granting decision. In addition to asking who is
selected into R&D subsidy programs and how, it should be asked who applies
for R&D subsidies and why. The objective of this paper is to provide a first
explorative step toward understanding firms application behavior by analyzing
the application for research and development subsidies in Finland.
Heckman and Smith (2004) provide three reasons why understanding the
participation process is important:
1. Helps to identify the sources of inequalities in the receipt of government
services.
2. Reveals information about the functioning of the program.
3. Provides information for more reliable econometric evaluation.
The first point stresses the need to have a thorough understanding of how differ-
ent stages of the participation process shape the participation of different groups
in a program. If there is unequal participation in a program it is important to
know which stage of the process creates this inequality. For example is it the
case that a specific group is less aware of a program than others, or is there
unequal behavior at the application phase. The second point highlights that
the participation process helps to understand how a program actually operates.
Understanding the outcomes of choices made by potential participants on the
one hand, and government bureaucrats on the other hand at different stages of
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the participation process helps identifying potential unexpected behavior not
intended by the policy design.
The last point has to do with the selection bias related to microeconometric
evaluation of different programs. There is a growing literature on quantitative
evaluations of the effects of public R&D subsidies on private R&D activities,
but results of the analyses are contradictory (see David, Hall, and Toole, 2000,
and Klette, Møen and Griliches, 2000, for surveys). The confusing empirical
findings have raised the question whether the econometric setups have been
adequately specified (Klette, Møen and Griliches, 2000 and Jaffe, 2002). One
of the major problems of these studies has been selection bias, which reflects
the fact that outcomes of potential applicants who have not received a subsidy
may differ systematically from what the outcomes of subsidized participants
would have been in the absence of subsidies.1 This selection bias makes it
difficult to identify the effect of a public subsidy. An understanding of the
participation process creating the selection problem provides basis for more
reliable microeconometric evaluation studies.2
As mentioned above, the participation process consists of two decisions: an
application decision by firms and a granting decision by the government. Poten-
tial participants decide whether to apply for a subsidy or not and the government
bureaucrats administering R&D subsidies decide to which applicants to grant
a subsidy. Often the latter is highlighted. The discussion about the alloca-
tion of R&D subsidies has centered on the question of whether the government
can identify projects with high social returns that the private sector would not
undertake on its own. Little attention is paid to the application behavior of
firms.
In this paper I use Finnish firm-level data on applicants and potential appli-
cants to characterize firms application behavior. To the best of my knowledge
there are no previous studies focusing on the application phase of R&D subsidy
programs. Blanes and Busom (2004) analyze the participation of firms in R&D
subsidy programs, but their data does not allow distinguishing between the ap-
plication and approval phases. Lichtenberg (1998) analyzes the determinants of
allocation of public biomedical research expenditure. More specifically, he ana-
1Heckman, Ichimura, Smith and Todd (1998) provide an extensive treatment of the selec-
tion bias.
2There is a vast literature discussing the role of participation process in econometric eval-
uations of social programs. Heckman, LaLonde and Smith (1999) cover extensively issues
related to econometric evaluation, and Heckman, Ichimura and Todd (1997, 1998) discusses
participation process especially in relation to the method of matching.
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lyzes how different characteristics of disease burden affect the amount of public
research expenditure allocated on a disease. Feldman and Kelley (2001) in turn
study how the attributes of a firm’s R&D strategy affect the chances of winning
an award from the Advanced Technology Program.
In addition to analyzing the characteristics underlying application for R&D
subsidies, this paper also examines the use of count data models in modeling the
application for R&D subsidies. The rich data at hand allows the identification of
applicants and non-applicants, but it also contains information on the number
of applications a firm has submitted during the observation period. This kind
of data calls for a count data model. Given that there is little evidence on
how to use count models in modeling application for R&D subsidies, it is not
straightforward to decide what kind of a count data model should be used. As
a result, various count models are estimated and compared.
The model selection exercise indicates that in using a count data framework
to model the application behavior it is important to take into account both
unobserved heterogeneity and excess zeros. Ignoring the issue that the sample
consists of both non-applicants and potential applicants can distort the results.
The interpretation of several regressors changes under the assumption that the
sample is a mixture compared to an analysis conducted under the assumption
that all the observations come from the same data generating process. Consid-
ering the sample as a mixture has also intuitive appeal. It provides a statistical
method for identifying whether a firm is aware of the program or not.
The findings of this paper suggest that firms that are the most likely to have
eligible projects, are also aware of the R&D subsidy program. In other words,
the program seems to reach firms that are the most potential participants. In
addition the results indicate that the opportunity cost of applying is lower for
firms quite at the beginning of their life cycle. The results also provide evidence
that external knowledge is important in lowering the application cost. Industry
level heterogeneity in application behavior seems to be related to the application
activity of potential applicants rather than the awareness of the program.
The structure of this paper is the following. Section 2 overviews the business
funding activities of the Finnish Funding Agency for Technology and Innovation.
Section 3 discusses the application decision in relation to the whole participation
process that determines who participates in R&D subsidy programs. Section
4 introduces count data models, discusses features of the sample in question
and presents model selection process. Section 5 describes the data and Section
6 provides the results obtained from different count data models. Section 7
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presents some conclusions.
2 Overview of business R&D funding activities
of Tekes3
The Finnish Funding Agency for Technology and Innovation (Tekes) is the prin-
cipal public promoter of private R&D in Finland and also the most important
public financier of business R&D. The primary objective of Tekes is to promote
the competitiveness of Finnish industry and the service sector by technological
means. This is done by providing funding and expert services to both business
and public R&D. Public R&D consists of research conducted in universities,
academic institutions and research institutes. According to the Tekes annual
report 2004, Tekes funding amounted to 409 million euros in 2004, of which
237 million euros was allocated to the business sector. In terms of projects this
translates into 2242 projects of which 1464 were business R&D projects. In this
paper the focus is on the business R&D funding activities of Tekes.
Business R&D funding is meant for firms operating in Finland and striving
to improve business operations by technological means (www.tekes.fi). How-
ever, one clear trend in the business funding of Tekes has been the increasing
role of small and medium sized firms (SMEs).4Large firms are not excluded from
Tekes funding, but requirements imposed on them are somewhat more stringent
compared to SMEs. Large firms’ projects should fulfil at least one of the fol-
lowing criteria: networking with SMEs and universities or research institutes,
participation in a technology program (technology programs are explained in the
next subsection), participation in an international R&D project and network,
a project consisting mainly of industrial research, or research outcomes have to
become public. Both in terms of applications received and amounts granted the
relative share of SMEs grew steadily especially over the 90s. The same trend
has continued after the 2000, but to a lesser extent. The share of applications
by firms with less than 100 employees increased from 36 percent in 1990 to 69
percent in 2000 and the share of business funding allocated to SMEs rose from
3This section relies on publicly available material that consists of Tekes annual report
2004, “World of technology, Joy of innovation” brochure of Tekes and information from web-
site www.tekes.fi concerning the business funding of Tekes.
4An enterprise is considered a SME if 1) it has less than 250 employees, 2) large firms
ownership is under 25 % and 3) its yearly turnover is less than 40 million euros or its balance
sheet total is not over 27 million euros.
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22 percent in 1990 to 53 percent in 2000. In 2004, SMEs received 55 percent of
the total business R&D funding of Tekes .
2.1 Funding instruments
Key funding instruments of Tekes are grants and low-interest loans. In 2004, 70
percent of the business R&D funding consisted of grants. In general the same
criteria apply to both grants and subsidized loans. However, distance to market
is a key element determining the suitable funding instrument: grants are directed
to R&D work done at the early phases of the innovation process that involve
greater uncertainty, namely generation of new knowledge and prototypes that
provide a basis for new marketable applications. Subsidized loans and capital
loans are aimed at R&D work in the later stages of the innovation process in
which the focus is on developing a complete marketable product or service. In
practice the distinction between different phases of the innovation process is not
clear-cut and a project can incorporate both stages. As a result, Tekes funding
can be a combination of several instruments.
Almost half of Tekes business R&D funding is steered through technology
programs. Technology programs aim at strengthening key technologies and
expertise from the perspective of Finland’s future. In addition technology pro-
grams aim at promoting collaboration, networking, and the diffusion of tech-
nologies.
2.2 Funding criteria
Tekes uses a selective funding practice that follows specific predefined criteria
to allocate the funding. The qualification criteria used in the project evaluation
are related to:
a) the business activity to be pursued - The goal is to promote projects
that generate profitable business opportunities for global markets.
b) the technology, innovation or competence to be developed - The tech-
nology, innovation or competence to be developed should be tech-
nologically new and challenging at least to the company itself. In
addition, knowledge and know-how created within the project should
generate long lasting competitive advantage to the company.
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c) the resources reserved for the proposed project - To be realistic the
project proposal should incorporate adequate human and economic
resources and the overall economic stance of the company should be
in order.
d) co-operation within the project - One central aim of Tekes funding is
to promote both domestic and international networking with other
companies, universities and research centers.
e) societal benefits of the project - Societal benefits that favor Tekes
funding are: positive environmental effects, balanced regional devel-
opment, amelioration of the Finnish working and living conditions,
improvements to back up the development of social welfare,health-
care and equality, and promotion of the national energy strategy.
f) the effect of Tekes funding on the project - The aim is that with Tekes
funding the companies are willing to carry out more challenging
R&D projects than they otherwise would and that by providing re-
sources for efficient networking the funding enhances the widespread
use of the benefits of the project in the Finnish economy.
Technical advisers evaluate each project proposal and compare it to other project
proposals. Since the amount of funding is limited, it is not enough for a project
proposal to fulfill the Tekes criteria in order to get funding, but it must also
succeed in the competition against other proposals. The evaluation is done com-
pared to the relevant domestic and international reference group. In addition
to the project, also the company is evaluated.
3 Application as part of the participation process
Heckman and Smith (2004) decompose the participation process into five differ-
ent stages: eligibility, awareness, application, acceptance and enrollment. Even
though Heckman and Smith discuss participation in a social program such as
a job training program, their framework can also be applied to R&D subsidies.
The main scope of this paper is to analyze the application stage. In addition,
eligibility and awareness will be discussed, even though the data at hand do not
allow an empirical analysis of those phases. The last two stages acceptance and
enrollment are outside the scope of this paper and are not discussed further.
The third essay examines the acceptance stage.
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3.1 Eligibility for R&D subsidies
Eligibility determines potential applicants - the target group for the policy. In
relation to R&D subsidy programs, determining eligible applicants is often not a
straightforward exercise. Project level eligibility is difficult to define in practice,
and even if this could be done, there would hardly be appropriate project level
data needed to construct a sample of potential applicants. As a result, it is
common to define potential applicants based upon firm level eligibility. This
is the case also in this study. All the manufacturing firms and firms belonging
to the knowledge intensive service sector operating in Finland are regarded as
potential applicants in this paper.
In the case of R&D subsidies, eligibility has a somewhat different connotation
compared to social programs that often have explicit eligibility rules. R&D
subsidies are allocated to specific innovation projects, so both the applicant
(firm) and the innovation project have to be eligible for a subsidy. In Finland
the basic eligibility criteria for firms is that that the firm operates in Finland and
strives to improve business operations by technological means (www.tekes.fi).
This means that basically any firm operating in Finland can apply for R&D
subsidies. Eligibility at project level is far more complicated. There are no
explicit eligibility rules for projects. The overall guideline is that in the long
run, tax revenue from a project should outweigh the tax-paid public investment
(www.tekes.fi). Publicly stated funding criteria basically determine eligibility,
but they are very broad, abstract, numerous and rely on subjective evaluation
(see previous section). This gives room for a variety of interpretations. Based
on the official funding criteria, it is difficult to judge whether a project is eligible
for Tekes funding or not.
3.2 Awareness of R&D subsidies
The difficulty in defining eligibility has implications for awareness. As Heckman
and Smith (2004) argue, applicants have to be aware of the program and of
their eligibility for it. A firm may be aware of R&D subsidies, but misinterprets
eligibility. In the Finnish case I would argue that Tekes as such is well known
in Finland. Tekes was established in 1983, so it has a well established position
among the actors of Finnish technology policy. This is further supported by
the role of Tekes as a centralized agency administering government R&D sub-
sidies. In addition, Tekes has a strong regional representation through regional
Employment and economic development centers (see www.te-keskus.fi). Tekes
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also has quite a good visibility in the Finnish media. In 2005, electronic media
coverage of Tekes consisted of 2860 news.5
In terms of the funding Tekes provides the situation may be different. As
noted above, the official funding criteria give room for a variety of interpreta-
tions and based on them, it is difficult to judge whether a project is eligible
for Tekes funding or not. A potential applicant may be aware of Tekes, but
incorrectly thinks that the project is not suitable for Tekes funding. This argu-
ment is supported by the fact that the majority of the applicants contact Tekes
before submitting an application.6 In fact, on their website, Tekes suggests po-
tential applicants to contact Tekes to discuss the project idea before submitting
an application (www.tekes.fi). Even though this kind of services provided by
Tekes reduce the information barrier due to difficulties in determining whether
a project is eligible for Tekes funding or not, they are unlikely to completely
eliminate problems related to awareness.
3.3 The application decision
In the application stage potential applicants that are aware of Tekes funding
decide whether to submit an application or not. In making this decision, a
firm weights expected benefits against the costs of applying. The main ben-
efit to the firm from R&D subsidies is that they reduce the cost of R&D. In
relation to technology programs, Tekes also highlights the benefits from net-
working and information sharing between companies and research communities
(http://www.tekes.fi/English/programmes/what/what.html).
There are also costs associated with applying. It takes time and effort to
gather the information required in the application process and to fill in the
application form. Moreover the opportunity costs of the effort of making and
promoting an application are probably far greater than the direct monetary
costs of filling in and filing it. There are also additional administrative proce-
dures associated with R&D subsidy programs: firms have to organize a separate
bookkeeping for the subsidized project, Tekes approval is needed if the content
of the project changes once the project is launched, and firms have to report
about the progress and outcomes of the project during, at the end and after
5Information obtained from Tekes in May 2006. Tekes uses News Now -service from M-
Brain (www.m-brain.fi/English/newsnow.html) to get information about media coverage.
6This observation came up during the interviews and discussions I conducted while staying
11 months at Tekes in 2001.
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the project.7 In addition, publicity requirements, related especially to projects
funded within technology programs, may prevent some firms from applying.8
The above discussion highlights that there are several reasons why a firm
may not send an application. First, a firm simply is not aware of the pro-
gram. Second, a firm may be aware of the program but misinterprets eligibility.
Third, the activities of a firm may be outside the scope of the program. Fourth,
application costs are so high that it is not profitable for a firm to apply.
4 The econometric setup
The data at hand does not only provide information on whether a firm submit-
ted an application to Tekes, but also the number of applications submitted by
a firm during the observation period is known. As a result I analyze the appli-
cation for R&D subsidies by examining the number of applications a firm has
submitted to Tekes during the observation period. This set up calls for a count
data model. A standard candidate for a count data model would be the Poisson
regression model (PRM) (see e.g. Greene, 1997 or Wooldridge, 2002 ). One
characteristic of the PRM is that it assumes equidispersion. However, often the
conditional variance exceeds the conditional mean, i.e. there is overdispersion.
This overdispersion can be a consequence of unobserved heterogeneity, excess
zeros, occurrence dependence between events or a combination of them. Espe-
cially in cross section data, it is difficult to identify the source of overdispersion.
4.1 Overdispersion due to unobserved heterogeneity
The solution to unobserved heterogeneity lies in more flexible modeling of the
variance function.9 This can be done in two ways: 1) moving away from the
complete distributional specification to a specification of the first two moments,
or 2) specifying a distribution that permits more flexible modeling of the vari-
ance than the Poisson. The first solution relies on the fact that the maximum
likelihood (ML) estimator provides consistent estimates of PRM as long as the
conditional mean function is correctly specified. The complete distributional
assumption can thus be relaxed in favor of more general modeling of the vari-
ance function without loosing consistency of the estimates. This leads to what
7These problems related to administrative burden are not specific to Finland, but applies
to R&D programs in general (Investing in Research and Innovation, 2004).
8Tekes publishes abstracts of projects funded within technology programs.
9Sections 4.1 and 4.2 rely on Cameron and Trivedi (1998).
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Cameron and Trivedi (1998, 1986) call the Poisson pseudo maximum likelihood
(PML) estimator. There are various standard error estimators depending on
what functional form, if any, is assumed for the variance function.
One way to apply the second solution is to use continuous mixture models.
In a continuous mixture model a stochastic error term is introduced into the
conditional mean function reflecting the fact that the true mean is not fully
observed. One common approach is to use a multiplicative stochastic error term.
Various generalized count models can be generated by mixture models. One
example is the widely used negative binomial model that can be represented as
a Poisson-gamma mixture. The two common versions of the negative binomial
model are what Cameron and Trivedi (1998) call the the NB2 and the NB1
models.10
4.2 Overdispersion due to excess zeros
In some cases, data display overdispersion through excess zeros. This means
that the probability of obtaining a zero count is higher than what is consis-
tent with the Poisson or some other specified distribution. The underlying
reason for excess zeros is that zeros and the positives are generated by different
data generating processes. Hurdle and zero-inflated models are the commonly
used modified count models that deal with excess zeros.11 These models alter
both the conditional mean and the conditional variance functions relative to the
PRM.
In the hurdle model the underlying idea is that a binomial probability model
determines whether a zero or a positive realization is observed. If the hurdle
is crossed, then a truncated-at-zero count model determines the conditional
distribution of the positives. If yi is the observed count for observation i, then
the probability mass function is of the form
Pr(yi = j) =
f1(0), j = 01−f1(0)
1−f2(0)f2(j), j > 1, 2, ..
(1)
Where f1(.) and f2(.) are the probability mass functions related to the binomial
10Let µi denote the expected count for observation i. NB2 model yields a variance function
µi(1+αµi) and NB1 model a variance function (1+α)µi. Both versions imply overdispersion
as long as α is greater than zero. If α = 0 we are back at the PRM. Estimation of PML with
variance function(1 + α)µi yields the ML estimates of the NB1 model.
11Hurdle model dates back to Cragg (1971) and Mullahy (1986), whereas Lambert (1992)
and Greene (1994) have introduced the zero-inflated model.
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probability model and the count model respectively. Various probability mass
functions can be specified. In this study the binomial probability model is a
logit model with parameter vector γ, and the truncated at zero count process
is specified to follow either a Poisson or a negative binomial distribution, with
parameters β related to covariate-vector x.
In the zero-inflated count models it is in turn assumed that zeros can occur
in two distinct states. There are two populations: one for which the event of
interest is unlikely to occur and the other that experiences the event of interest
according to a count data process. There are two data-generating processes
at work: the first data-generating process determines whether an observation
remains in a stage in which the event of interest does not occur or moves to a
stage in which events occur at some rate. The second data-generating process
generates the observed count that can also be zero.
Let qi denote the probability that observation i stays at the state in which
events do not occur. Correspondingly (1 − qi) denotes the probability that
observation i moves to the state in which the observed count is generated. The
zero-inflated count data model specification for the probability of observing a
count j for observation i is
Pr(yi = j) =
qi + (1− qi)f(j), j = 0(1− qi)f(j), j > 1, 2, .. (2)
where f (.) is the probability mass function of the chosen probability distribution
related to the count data process, usually a Poisson or a negative binomial
distribution, with parameters β related to covariate-vector x .
qi is allowed to be determined by a binomial probability model with a set
of covariates w .Let z denote a binary indicator variable that takes a value 1
if observation i stays at state one, and a value 0 if observation i moves to the
second state. Then
qi = Pr(zi = 1) = F (wi, γ). (3)
F (. , .) is the cumulative distribution function related to the chosen binomial
probability model. Standard candidates for the distribution are the standard
normal distribution (generating a probit model) and the logistic distribution
(generating a logit model) with parameter vector γ reflecting the impact of
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changes in w on the probability. In this study F(.,.) is the cumulative distribu-
tion function of a logistic distribution and f(.) is the probability mass function
of either a Poisson or a negative binomial distribution.
4.3 Characteristics of the data and reflections on the ap-
plication process
Returning to the current application, the data indicates there are signs of both
overdispersion and excess zeros in the data. Table 1 below reveals that the
variance is over six times larger than the mean, suggesting that overdispersion
is left even once the effect of covariates is taken into account. Intuition suggests
that unobserved heterogeneity may be present at least through occurrence de-
pendence. Once a firm has applied for R&D subsidies, it is likely that filling the
second application requires less effort. In other words, it is likely that previous
applications increase the probability of subsequent applications. This would fa-
vor a negative binomial distribution over a Poisson distribution in modeling the
occurrence of applications. In addition, Table 1 reveals that the data contain
significantly more zeros than would be predicted by a Poisson distribution with
a mean of 0.1497. This suggests the presence of excess zeros. Is it reasonable
to suppose that excess zeros are the result of the underlying data generating
process?
Table 1: Summary statistics and the frequency distributions of the number of
applications per firm.
There are two circumstances under which a firm does not send any applica-
tions during the observation period. First, a firm may send an application at
some other time, or may have sent an application in the past, but during the
observation period the firm does not submit any applications. This can happen
for example because the firm does not launch any suitable new projects during
the observation period or it does not see it profitable to send an application for
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the kind of projects launched during the period in question due to e.g. vari-
ation in opportunity costs. In the following, I call this kind of firms interim
non-applicants. Second, a firm may never even consider submitting an applica-
tion. This can happen because the firm is not aware of the program, or because
the scope of the firms activities in general is not suitable for the program.12 In
other words, there are firms among the potential applicants that do not consider
submitting an application under any circumstances. These firms are called real
non-applicants in the following. Potential applicants consist of both applicants
and interim non-applicants.
The main underlying difference between the hurdle model and the zero-
inflated model is that in the hurdle model only positives are allowed in the
count data process part of the model, whereas the zero-inflated model allows
some zeros to arise also from the count data process. This difference could be
interpreted so that the hurdle model makes a distinction between those firms
that apply, and those that do not apply. The zero-inflated model, in turn,
separates between firms that are likely to apply and firms that do not consider
applying. When considering the application process generating the observed
count of applications, both setups could be plausible. If the data at hand consist
of a well defined sample of potential applicants, i.e. applicants and interim non-
applicants, then intuition supports the hurdle model. A zero observation is
generated when a potential applicant decides not to send an application and
the hurdle model separates between interim non-applicants and applicants. An
alternative is the data may consist of a more general sample of firms: applicants,
interim non-applicants and also real non-applicants. In this case, intuition favors
the zero-inflated model.
As explained in section 3.1, it is in general not straightforward to define the
eligibility for R&D subsidies. This being the case also here, the data at hand
consist of a relatively broadly defined sample of firms that is likely to cover
both real and interim non-applicants - in addition to applicants. Therefore the
intuition would favor the zero-inflated model over the hurdle model.
4.4 The modeling approach
Given that the true cause of overdispersion is difficult to identify, the modeling
approach chosen here is to start from the standard Poisson model and then test
and evaluate more general models. First, models that treat unobserved hetero-
12Arundel and Hollanders (2005) report that 55 percent of Finnish firms do not innovate.
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geneity as the cause of overdispersion and allow for more flexible modeling of the
variance than the PRM are estimated and tested. More specifically, the Pois-
son PML estimator is used with different variance function specifications and
then the negative binomial model is estimated. Second, models that consider
overdispersion as a consequence of excess zeros generated by true underlying
behavior, namely the hurdle Poisson and zero-inflated Poisson models, are es-
timated. These models alter the conditional mean function with respect to the
PRM. Finally hurdle and zero-inflated versions of the negative binomial model
(NB2) are estimated. These models allow for both sources of overdispersion -
unobserved heterogeneity and true underlying behavior generating excess zeros.
Estimations are based on the method of maximum likelihood and model com-
parison and testing will be based on information criteria, overdispersion tests,
comparison of average predicted probabilities of counts with empirical relative
frequencies and chi-square goodness of fit test.
5 Data
The firm data I use, covering originally 14 657 Finnish firms, come from Asi-
akastieto Ltd. Asiakastieto is a for-profit company collecting, standardizing,
and selling firm specific quantitative information. The sample is drawn accord-
ing to the following criteria: the most recent financial statement of the firm in
the register is for either 2001 or 2000, the firm is a corporation, and the in-
dustrial classification of the firm belongs to the manufacturing, computer and
related activities, research and development, architectural and engineering ac-
tivities and related technical consultancy, technical testing and analysis. The
data are based on firms’ official profit sheet and balance sheet statements, plus
other information disclosed by the firms to public registries like the industrial
classification, geographical location, number of employees, whether a firm is an
exporter or an importer, and information related to the ownership of the firm
and the board composition. After cleaning the data of firms with missing values,
we are left with 12 275 firms.
These 12 275 firms were matched with application data from Tekes that
covers business sector applications Tekes received during the period January
1st 2000 to June 30th 2002. In total there were 2170 enterprises that applied
for product development or industrial research funding from Tekes during the
period. The matching was done using the business codes of firms. There were 31
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firms in the Tekes application data for which no business code was available so
they could not be matched with the Asiakastieto data. In total 1030 applicants
were found in the Asiakastieto data. In addition, Tekes provided information
on the number of applications the 12 275 firms had submitted to Tekes before
January, 2000. There are 1232 firms that have submitted applications to Tekes
before January, 2000, but not in the sample period.
There are three principal reasons why some 1000 Tekes-applicants could not
be identified in our sample of potential applicants: 1) the firm did not operate in
the industries from which the sample was formed; 2) the firm was so small that
it was not obliged by law to send its balance and profit sheets to the official
registry13; and 3) the firm did not have an official financial statement either
in 2001 or in 2000, because it was so recently established or had not yet been
officially established. In addition 109 Tekes-applicants drop when the original
data with 14 657 firms is cleaned of firms with missing values.
5.1 Quality of the data
As explained in the previous section, all manufacturing firms and firms belong-
ing to knowledge intensive business sectors are regarded as constituting the
population of interest in this study. It is important to assess how well the data
at hand describes the overall population of chosen industries in Finland and the
population of Tekes applicants. This was done by comparing the distributions
of firms in the Asiakastieto data to the overall distributions of Finnish firms in
manufacturing and knowledge intensive business sectors, and by comparing all
the Tekes applicants to those identified in the Asiakastieto data. The overall
distribution of Finnish firms in the relevant industries is provided by Statistics
Finland.
The comparisons according to the industry classification reveal that the
available data constitute a relatively good representation of the actual popu-
lations, both in general and in terms of Tekes applicants. In other words, the
distribution of firms belonging to the Asiakastieto data is well in line with the
overall distribution of Finnish firms across industries, and likewise the distri-
bution of Tekes applicants identified in the Asiakastieto data fits well to the
industry distribution of all Tekes applicants. However, in terms of size, the
quality could be better. Very small firms are clearly underrepresented among
firms in the Asiakastieto data as well as among Tekes applicants identified in
13Asiakastieto claims to cover well also these smaller firms, but apparently not all of them.
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the Asiakastieto data. Looking at the granted funding further highlights this
issue. Applicants identified in the Asiakastieto data cover 70 percent of granted
Tekes funding compared to their 53 percent share of applicants. Taking into
account the increased emphasis of Tekes on SMEs, the under-representation of
micro firms is certainly something that has to be kept in mind when interpreting
results.
5.2 Determinants of application
Table 2 displays summary statistics of explanatory variables for the whole sam-
ple, and Table 3 conditions the statistics on the application decision.14 As Table
2 shows, firms in the sample are heterogeneous. They are on average 12 years old
with 36 employees. A very high proportion, 97 percent, are SMEs according to
the official EU standard (see footnote 4). As explained in section 2, the funding
criteria of Tekes favor SMEs. Sales per employee (SALES_EMPL), a measure
of efficiency or a crude indication of value added, is 115 thousand euros, and
some 22 per cent have exports (EXPORTS). We also have information on two
corporate governance variables. In some 14 percent of potential applicants, the
CEO is also the chairman of the board (CEO_CHAIR). Such an arrangement
can, on the one hand, improve the information flow between the board and the
executive but, on the other hand, weakens the board’s independence. The board
of an average potential applicant has four to five members (BOARD). A larger
board is more likely to include members with outside knowledge that may be
useful either in conducting R&D (choosing among competing projects, organiz-
ing management of current projects, monitoring), or in the application process
itself. APPLICATIONS indicates the number of application a firm has submit-
ted to Tekes before the year 2000. PARENT is an indicator variable getting a
value one if the firm is a parent company. R&D_INV is the capitalized R&D in-
vestment in the balance sheet divided by firm’s book value of total assets at the
end of the year and R&D is an indicator variable taking value 1 if the firm has
reported R&D investments in the balance sheet. I am well aware of the prob-
lems related to the balance sheet measure of R&D investment. For many firms,
14Sales figures and the R&D investment figures used are for the year preceding the first
application or the nearest available of the preceding years back to 1999. There were 12 firms
that applied in 2000 with 1999 figures missing. However 10 of them applied also in 2001 and
the remaining two in 2002 so the figures for 2000 were used for these firms. 10 691 firms have
figures for 1999, 1528 have figures for 2000 and 56 firms figures for 2001. R&D investment is
measured as the share of total assets in the balance sheet. Other variables represent the state
at the time of retrieval of the data, mainly the year 2000.
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especially SMEs, it is difficult to separate R&D expenses from other activities of
the firm. In addition, even larger firms with more established R&D departments
do not necessarily want to announce figures related to their R&D expenditures.
Unfortunately it is the only available measure of R&D investment.
Table 2: Descriptive statistics for the whole sample.
From Table 3 we see that applicants are larger than non-applicants. The
median number of employees for non-applicants is 5, for applicants 27. Also the
sales per employee is somewhat larger for the applicants. Despite the problems
related to the used R&D measures, applicants stand out as more engaged in
R&D activities. However, only 13 percent of applicants have reported R&D
investment in the balance sheet, which clearly indicates the flaws related to the
balance sheet figure of R&D investment. The applicants also tend to have larger
boards. Quite naturally, applicants have more previous applications on average
than non-applicants. The difference in both means and medians is 4. Export
orientation stands clearly out among the applicants. 57 percent of applicants
have exports compared to 19 percent of non-applicants. In addition the share
of parent companies is substantially higher among the applicants.
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Table 3: Descriptive statistics for applicants and non-applicants
6 Estimation results
6.1 Model evaluation and selection
Comparison and testing of models is based on Akaike and Bayesian information
criteria (AIC and BIC respectively), a chi-square goodness of fit test (GoF-
test), the likelihood ratio test (LR-test) and the Vuong-test. When comparing
the standard Poisson regression model (PRM) to the pseudo maximum likeli-
hood (PML) estimates and to the negative binomial model (NB2), estimated
standard errors and overdispersion coefficient are also analyzed (Table 4). Ta-
ble 5 summarizes the results of model comparison and testing.15 In Table 6 the
average predicted probabilities of counts generated by each model are compared
with the empirical relative frequencies.
15Tables 8 and 9 in Appendix 1 present the results of model comparison and testing in more
detail, and Table 10 in Appendix 2 shows full estimation results.
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Table 4: Estimation results of Poisson PML and negative binomial model.
Comparison of the ML estimates of PRM to the PML estimates and to the
NB2 model indicates that unobserved heterogeneity may be present. As Table
4 shows, ML based standard error estimates16 are substantially lower than the
Poisson PML estimates.17 This is an indication of overdispersion and suggests
16Hessian (MLH) and outer product (MLOP) estimates.
17The NB1 estimates based on the NB1 variance function (1 + α)µi, and robust sandwich
(RS) and bootstrap (Boot) estimates based on an unspecified variance function.
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that the ML standard errors should not be used. A comparison of the PRM and
the NB2 model also conveys that PRM is not adequate for the data, because the
overdispersion parameter α gets a highly significant value in the NB2 model as
Table 4 reveals. Table 5 also shows that both the AIC and BIC favor the NB2
model over PRM. Moreover, the LR-test rejects the PRM over the NB2 model.
However, the GoF-test based on actual and predicted frequencies rejects both
the PRM and the NB2 model.
Table 5: Summary of model selection results
Estimation results of zero-inflated (ZIP) and hurdle-Poisson models suggest
that overdispersion through excess zeros is also something that should be taken
into account.18 Table 5 shows that based on AIC and BIC the ZIP model
is preferred over the PRM and the NB2 model. The hurdle-Poisson model is
also preferred over PRM. However, the information criteria favor NB2 over the
hurdle-Poisson. In addition the Vuong test rejects PRM in favor of ZIP, and
the LR-test rejects PRM against the hurdle-Poisson model. However, based
on the results it is difficult to conclude whether the zero-inflated or the hurdle
specification should be used. AIC and BIC favor the zero-inflated specification,
but in terms of actual and predicted frequencies shown in Table 6 it is difficult to
discriminate between the two. The chi-square goodness-of-fit test rejects both
specifications.
The above analyses provide evidence in favor of both unobserved heterogene-
ity and excess-zeros. Estimation results related to negative binomial versions of
the zero-inflated (ZINB) and the hurdle (Hurdle-NegBin) specifications provide
further evidence in this respect. Both the information criteria and goodness-of-
fit test favor the negative binomial specifications over the Poisson specifications.
In addition the LR-tests reject ZIP in favor of ZINB and hurdle-Poisson in favor
of hurdle-NegBin. This suggests that unobserved heterogeneity is present. A
18A Logit model is used in the binomial part in both models and the count processes follow
a Poisson distribution.
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Table 6: Actual and predicted cell frequencies for different models.
Vuong test of NB2 versus ZINB and a LR-test of NB2 versus Hurdle-NegBin in
turn provide evidence that overdispersion through excess zeros is also present.
Both ZINB and Hurdle-NegBin are chosen over NB2.
The results suggest that taking into account both unobserved heterogeneity
and excess zeros could be an improvement. However, the choice between ZINB
and Hurdle-NegBin is less clearcut. AIC and BIC favor the zero-inflated speci-
fication. Chi-square goodness-of-fit tests do not reject either of the models, but
Hurdle-NegBin seems to provide a better fit to the data when comparing the
actual and predicted cell frequencies presented in Table 6. Based on these model
comparisons it is difficult to say whether the zero-inflated or hurdle specification
should be used. Given that the intuition presented in section 4.3 supports the
zero-inflated specification, ZINB is selected as the final model.
6.2 Estimation results
Before analyzing the estimation results of ZINB in detail, it is interesting to
have a look at the estimated coefficients of the NB2 versus the ZINB specifica-
tions presented in Appendix 2. The results show how the explanatory power of
regressors in the ZINB specification is divided between the two processes com-
pared to the NB2 model. For example the regressor EXPORTER has a highly
significant coefficient in the NB2 model, but the two part model indicate that
EXPORTER determines whether an observation belongs to potential applicants
or not rather than the number of events. The same happens with the indicator
variable R&D. In addition most of the statistically significant regressors get a
smaller coefficient estimate once overdispersion through excess zeros is taken
into account. This suggests that in order to get a more solid interpretation of
the results, it is important to take into account excess zeros.
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Table 7 presents the full estimation results of the ZINB model including
industry and regional dummies and also marginal effects for the regressors.
Marginal effects are presented for both parts of the model; i.e. with respect the
unconditional expected number of applications, and the probability of belonging
to the group of potential applicants. Moreover the marginal effects with respect
to the unconditional mean of applications are divided between the effect due
to a change in the probability of belonging to the group of potential applicants
and due to change in the count process. Calculated marginal effects represent
average response over all observations.19
6.2.1 Binary process
Coefficient estimates for the binary process reported in Table 7 indicate whether
a regressor has a positive or negative influence on the probability of being a
potential applicant. Given that eligibility and awareness determine whether a
firm is a potential applicant, interpretation of the estimation results reflects
upon the effect the regressors might have on these two components. Size of
the firm is positively related to the probability of being a potential applicant,
i.e. the larger the firm the likelier it is that the firm is a potential applicant.
This effect may be due to eligibility and awareness. Larger firms are likelier to
conduct innovative activities that are eligible for R&D subsidies, but also larger
firms are likelier to be better informed about the subsidy program.
The positive coefficient of sales per employee reflects the activities of in-
novative firms that on average generate higher sales per employee compared
to non-innovative firms. As a result firms with higher sales per employee are
likelier to launch projects that are eligible for R&D subsidies. The number of
members in the board of the firm increases the probability of being a potential
applicant. This indicates that a larger board is likelier to provide the firm with
knowledge that increases the likelihood of the firm to be aware of the R&D
subsidy program.
19For continuous regressors AGE, SALES_EMPL, APPLIC, and BOARD, marginal effect
gives the change in the expected value of the dependent variable due to a one-unit change in a
regressor. In the case of the logarithmic regressor LNEMPL, marginal effect gives the change
due to one-percent change in the number of employees. The marginal effects of R&D_INV
are calculated in terms of R&D_INV*100, giving the change in the dependent variable due
to one-percent change in the share. Both the value of the variable and it’s square are taken
into account in the calculations. For dummy variables (R&D, SME, PARENT, EXPORTER,
CEO_CHAIR, industry dummies and regional dummies) the calculated effect is the difference
between the expected value of the dependent variable when the dummy variable gets a value
one and the expected value of the dependent variable when the dummy variable gets a value
zero.
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Table 7: Estimation results of the zero-inflated negative binomial model.
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The three most important factors affecting the probability of being a po-
tential applicant are the number of previous applications, the R&D dummy
variable and whether the firm has exports or not, all of which have a strong
positive effect on the probability. Together these three factors capture firms
that most evidently belong to the group of potential applicants. When looking
at the marginal effects in the last column of Table 7, the magnitude of the effect
these factors have on the probability stands out clearly. The pronounced effect
of these factors suggests that the R&D subsidy program reaches the most ev-
ident potential applicants - i.e. R&D oriented firms operating in international
markets. However, at the same time it raises the question of whether R&D sub-
sidies are capable of encouraging established non R&D oriented firms to engage
in R&D activities.
Across industries there are small differences in the probability of being a
non-applicant. Firms belonging to other manufacturing industries have a lower
probability of being a potential applicant, whereas firms belonging to the data-
processing industry have a higher probability of belonging to potential appli-
cants compared to the base category of metal and metal products industry. The
marginal effect reveals that belonging to the data-processing industry increases
the probability of being a potential applicant by 18 percent. This result may be
due to the sample period in question that covers the years of the IT-boom.
6.2.2 Count process
Coefficient estimates of the count process in Table 7 indicate the effect of
the regressors on the expected number of applications for potential applicants.
Whether a potential applicant sends an application depends on the costs of ap-
plying vis a vis expected benefits. On average, younger firms tend to send more
applications. This could indicate that younger firms, with less internal funding
and possibly facing financing constraints, are more in need of R&D subsidies.
In other words the opportunity cost of applying is lower for smaller firms. Firm
size, measured as the number of employees, is positively related to the num-
ber of application. This result seems rather obvious. Larger firms are likelier
to have several R&D projects underway simultaneously. Sales per employee is
negatively related to the expected number of applications. This may reflect
that innovative firms quite at the beginning of their life cycle are more in need
of R&D subsidies. Those firms are at the stage in which the main focus is in
developing something that is expected to generate revenues and higher sales per
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employee in the future. Together with the age of the firm this suggests that the
opportunity cost of applying is lower for firms quite at the beginning of their
life cycle.
The number of previous applications is positively related to the number of
applications sent in the sample period. This result is intuitive. Numerous pre-
vious applications indicate that the firm is actively engaged in R&D. Moreover
there may be learning going on. Through numerous applications the firm may
have learnt a great deal about how to fill in the application and what kind of
activities Tekes favours. Both of these factors support the observation that a
firm with numerous previous applications is likelier to continue sending several
applications also in the future compared to firms with no or just one applica-
tion. It may even be the case, that for small firms with little R&D activities,
a subsidy received just before the sample period might be negatively related to
applications in the sample period. The intuition is that these small firms are
busy with the ongoing project and do not launch new R&D projects right after
starting the previous one.
The number of members in the board of the firm is positively related to
the expected number of applications. This may suggest that a larger board is
likelier to provide the firm with knowledge that lowers the application costs.
In addition firms that are parent companies have on average higher expected
number of application than other firms. This may reflect the tendency of con-
cerns to establish centralized research-oriented R&D laboratories within parent
companies. Another explanation might be that the parent company administers
applications originating from various companies of the consolidated corporation.
In terms of application costs this could be interpreted so that, given the expe-
rience of parent companies in filling applications, the application cost for them
is lower.
Industry dummies indicate that belonging to almost any industry other than
the metal industry increases the expected number of applications - only excep-
tions are the food -, paper - and telecommunications industry. At the regional
level the only difference is the region 5, which stands for Northern Finland and
Lapland. It is quite surprising to notice that firms in Northern Finland or Lap-
land are on average more active applicants than firms in Southern Finland. This
result is driven by the fact that there are a couple of active applicants among
the few applicants from Northern Finland.
Marginal effects with respect to the unconditional expected number of appli-
cations are divided between the effect due to change in the probability of being
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a potential applicant and the effect due to change in the expected number of
applications conditional on being a potential applicant. Marginal effects indi-
cate the magnitude of the effect the regressors have. The first observation is
that in general, effects seem relatively small. However, one should bear in mind
that 92 percent of the firms have zero applications in the sample period. As a
result the average expected number of applications is only 0.1497. This means
that although the marginal effects may seem small in absolute terms, the effect
of regressors cannot be interpreted to be negligible.
Marginal effects reveal that two thirds of the effect that the size of the firm
has on the expected number of applications is generated by the effect size has on
the expected number of applications conditional on being a potential applicant.
In other words, in relation to the unconditional expected number of applications,
size is more important in determining the number of applications than the prob-
ability of being a potential applicant. The opposite is true for the number of
previous applications. 80 percent of the effect previous applications has on the
expected number of applications is generated by the change in the probability
of being a potential applicant. The marginal effect with respect to the number
of members in the board indicate that the change in the expected number of
applications is mainly generated by the effect BOARD has on the conditional
count process. 80 percent of the total marginal effect is generated through the
change in the conditional expected number of applications. Marginal effects
with respect to the industry dummies further strengthen the observation that
in general, industry level differences in the expected number of applications are
mainly generated by different application activity of the potential applicants in
different industries.
7 Conclusions
This paper examined the application for R&D subsidies using count data mod-
els. Given the importance of R&D subsidy programs as one of the main in-
novation policy tools, we know surprisingly little about the process that allo-
cates them - i.e. the participation process. Heckman and Smith (2004) define
the participation in a program as consisting of five different stages: awareness,
eligibility, application, acceptance and enrollment. There are two important
decision problems underlying this participation process: application decision of
firms and acceptance decision of government bureaucrats. By focusing on the
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application stage, this paper provides the first explorative step toward under-
standing firms’ application behavior, which, to the best of my knowledge, has
not been investigated before.
Applications for R&D subsidies are investigated by analyzing the number
of applications a firm sent to the Finnish Funding Agency for Technology and
Innovation (Tekes) during the period of January, 2000 - June, 2002. Tekes is the
principal public promoter of private R&D in Finland and also the most impor-
tant public financier of business R&D. I analyzed various count data models and
found that it is important to take into account both unobserved heterogeneity
and excess zeros when modeling the number of applications.
The zero-inflated negative binomial model provided an intuitive framework
for the analysis and was chosen as the final model. The zero-inflated specification
models the probability of being a potential applicant and the expected number
of applications conditional on being a potential applicant. Estimation results
indicated that omitting especially the problem of excess zeros may distort the
results. The explanatory power of regressors in the zero-inflated specification
is divided between the two processes compared to the corresponding non zero-
inflated count model.
Estimation results yield several findings:
• The number of previous applications, reported R&D-investments prior
to the sample period and export activities have a pronounced positive
effect on the probability of being a potential applicant. This indicates
that the R&D subsidy program seems to reach the most evident potential
applicants - firms engaged in R&D activities and operating in international
markets.
• Age of the firm and sales per employee have a negative effect on the
application activity suggesting that the opportunity cost of applying is
higher for well established, older firms with higher sales per employee.
• The number of members in the board of the firm is positively related to the
number of applications. This suggests that external knowledge is valuable
in lowering the application costs.
• Industry level heterogeneity is related to application activity of potential
applicants rather than to the probability of being a potential applicant.
In terms of eligibility and awareness, the results of the binary process modeling
the probability of being a potential applicant could be interpreted so that those
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firms that are the most likely to have eligible projects, are also aware of the
R&D subsidy program. In other words, the program seems to reach firms that
are the most potential participants, and in that sense the program could be
considered to work well. However, if the aim of the program is also to encourage
established firms to engage in R&D activities, the conclusion is less clear cut.
The way firms engaged in R&D activities and operating in international markets
stand out suggests that there may be problems related to the awareness of firms
that are not “by definition” among the potential applicants.
In relation to the application decision, the results suggest that firms quite at
the beginning of the life cycle are more in need of R&D subsidies and therefore
have stronger incentives to apply. This result supports the policy argument
related to R&D subsidy programs that due to market failures especially young
innovative firms need public R&D support. In addition, this result suggests that
an important target group of the policy finds the program attractive.
The finding that supports the usefulness of external knowledge in lowering
application costs indicates that trying the reduce the applications costs firms
face, could be important in increasing application activity. Industry level con-
clusions are that there are no considerable differences in the awareness of the
program across industries, but the application behavior is somewhat heteroge-
neous. This may be due to both different industry characteristics and policy
emphasis that favor specific industries over others.
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Table 10: Estimation results
33
Table 11: Estimation results (continued)
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